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1. Introduction: 
When South Africa elected to adopt competition law legislation that included public interest 
provisions, this served to spark immediate controversy and proved divisive amongst policy 
makers and economists.1 With the Competition Act2 of 1998 introducing these 
considerations, heated debate was ignited with regards to how such public interest 
concerns would be applied in practice when a merger is proposed, or when a case involves 
prohibited conduct.3 The competition authorities have been confronted with addressing this 
task and clarifying the surrounding uncertainty, having grappled in recent years with 
mergers of a high profile nature, and excessive pricing cases (particularly in the context of 
previously state-owned entities), which implicate the public interest, necessitating 
development in somewhat unchartered terrain: the incorporation into competition policy of 
what would, traditionally-speaking, be non-competition objectives, in merger cases such as 
Momentum/Metropolitan4, Kansai/Freeworld5 and Wal-Mart/Massmart6, and prohibited 
conduct cases such as Nationwide Poles v Sasol7, Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and 
Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Another8, and Competition 
Commission v Sasol Chemical Industries Limited9. 
The traditional purpose of Competition law has primarily been the protection and 
enhancement of consumer welfare.10 There are significant challenges which present 
themselves when attempting to reconcile this objective with the public interest 
considerations which the statute now enshrines.11  
                                                          
1  Boshoff, Dingley & Dingley 'The Economics of Public Interest Provisions In South African Competition Policy' 
(2012) 1. 
2 Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
3 Supra note 1. 
4 Metropolitan Holdings Ltd v Momentum Group Ltd (41/LM/Jul10) [2010] ZACT 87 (9 December 2010). 
5 Kansai Paint Co. Ltd v Freeworld Coatings Ltd (53/AM/JUL11) [2012] ZACT 7 (20 January 2012). 
6 Minister of Economic Development and others v Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and others (110/CAC/Jun11 and 
111/CAC/Jun11) [2012] ZACAC (9 March 2012). 
7 Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v Nationwide Poles CC (49/CAC/Apr05) [2005] ZACAC 5. 
8 Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Another 
70/CAC/APR07. 
9 Competition Commission v Sasol Chemical Industries Limited 48/CR/Aug10. 
10 Supra note 1 at 2. 
11 Ibid. 
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The underlying rationale behind including public interest in South African Competition policy 
is to satisfy our pressing economic redistributive justice needs.12 Upon the advent of our 
Constitutional democracy in 1994, the government found itself presented with daunting 
economic and social obligations, particularly regarding the previously disadvantaged.13 
David Lewis, who formerly acted as chairperson of the Competition Tribunal (doing so for a 
decade from when it was first founded in 1999), advocated including public interest factors 
during the evaluation of mergers, and further asserted that considerations of this nature are 
weightier in developing nations such as South Africa when contrasted with their lesser 
significance in developed countries.14 Lewis supports this stance through highlighting that in 
developing nations, the role of industrial policy is more prominent.15 Lewis posits that if a 
competition statute failed to be cognizant of its impact on ensuring that black ownership is 
promoted (salient in the South African context), or how it affects employment, then the 
completion authorities would be discredited.16  
The realisation of moral and political values is identified by Hantke-Domas as the essential 
function of public interest considerations in the context of Competition law.17 Decision-
makers should adopt such a conception to inform their deliberations and to assist in the 
resolution of disputes where the public interest is in issue.18 These values are both generally 
and specifically articulated in the Competition Act, with their inclusion in the preamble and 
purpose sections, along with provisions in the legislation which directly address them.19   
s 12A, the merger review section of the Competition Act, obliges that competition 
authorities consider whether public interest grounds can or cannot justify a transaction 
being proposed.20 The public interest considerations included in the Act are: the effect on “a 
particular industrial sector or region; employment; the ability of small businesses, or firms 
                                                          
12 Yongama Njisane 'The rise of Public Interest: Recent high profile mergers' (2011) 3. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Michael Hantke-Domas 'The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non Existence or Misinterpretation?' 
(2003) 15(2) European Journal of Law and Economics. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Supra note 1 at 2.  
20  Supra note 2 at section 12A. 
4 
 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and the 
ability of national industries to compete in international markets”.21 
When approaching proposed mergers, the Act also requires that the Competition 
authorities consider whether these are “likely to substantially prevent or lessen 
competition”.22 If such a deleterious impact on competition proves to be present, a 
consideration becomes necessary of whether the merger in question will nonetheless likely 
result in “technological, efficiency, or other pro-competitive gain” that can be balanced 
against the detrimental impact on competition.23 Thus the Act inherently considers 
traditional welfare effects which arise from the transaction, “which typically includes an 
analysis of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiencies”.24 
It is arguable that when analysing mergers, certain cases may involve tension between 
equity and efficiency, with an apparent trade-off between these caused by the conflict 
between welfare and public interest which can arise in practice.25 Lewis took cognizance of 
these tensions, stating that he was “quite comfortable with the requirement that we must 
balance competition and public interest considerations”.26 Lewis acknowledged that this 
may be challenging in practice, further elaborating:   
“It makes for complex decision making... realpolitik, at least, dictates that we do not insist 
on eliminating either the "political economy" or distributional objectives or "the pure 
economy" or allocative efficiency objectives.  The trick is reconciling them in practice, and 
this in turn, is tied up, first, with the process of building a new, broad-based constituency for 
antitrust and, second, with the mode of implementation of policy and regulation”.27 
Lewis expresses his support for reconciling these sometimes conflicting objectives, however 
this attitude was not initially favoured by the Competition Tribunal, which in the past 
preferred a deferential approach in which other governmental agencies specifically 
mandated with the task of addressing these public interest factors could do so; the Tribunal 
                                                          
21  Supra note 2 at section 12A(3). 
22  Ibid at section 12A(1). 
23 Ibid at section 12A(1)(a)(i). 
24 Supra note 1 at 2. 
25 Ibid at 3.  
26 Lewis, D, Presentation entitled 'The Political Economy of Antitrust', Fordham Corporate Law Institute's 28th 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (2001) October 25 & 26, at 4. 
27 Ibid.  
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conceived their own role as secondary to these other agencies.28 The merger in 
Shell/Tepco29 is illustrative of such a deferential attitude.30 Due to Tepco’s status as a black 
empowerment oil company, the Commission submitted the recommendation that the 
transaction be approved only on the condition that Tepco’s continued independence was 
ensured, with it being controlled by both Thebe and Shell.31 The Commission sought to 
honour the Act’s public interest provisions by proposing that this merger be conditional in 
this way. If Tepco’s status as an independent participant in the petroleum industry was to be 
removed, the ability of a firm controlled by historically disadvantaged individuals to become 
competitive would be impeded.32 Despite this reasoning, the Tribunal proceeded to dismiss 
the Commission’s recommendation: the Tribunal identified legislative instruments that they 
considered to be more appropriate to address these issues, stating that the case should 
rather refer to the Skills Development Act, the Employment Equity Act, and the Petroleum 
Charter.33 Furthermore, the Tribunal cautioned that the Commission should not misconstrue 
its required function in relation to the public interest, warning that this should not operate 
in an “over- zealous manner lest they damage precisely those interests that they seek to 
protect”.34 
A salient question therefore becomes apparent: when balancing welfare and public interest 
considerations, are the competition authorities the most appropriate institutions to do so?35 
It is possible that doing so may pose a threat to democratic values, as identified by Gal.36 
This potential threat becomes evident when one acknowledges that officials within the 
Competition authorities are not in their position through the democratic process of a 
general election – there is an absence of any mandate from the electorate to make public 
policy determinations.37 There are often complex economic, social, political and cultural 
implications which flow from decisions which are taken in the public interest.38 These 
                                                          
28  Supra note 1 at 3. 
29 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd (66/LM/Oct01) [2002] ZACT 13 (22 February 2002). 
30 Supra note 1 at 3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Supra note 29 at para 58. 
35 Supra note 1 at 3.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
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implications would not necessarily be confined to the public interest consideration directly 
in issue: at face value, a case may appear to involve a single company experiencing job 
losses, but in reality there could be a multitude of knock-on effects resulting from this.39 
Ascertaining and responding to these potentially far-reaching effects could be a task which 
competition authorities find themselves ill-equipped to grapple with.40 It has always been 
the domain of government to determine public policy.41 Competition authorities may lack 
the most effective and efficient tools needed to truly advance the public interest, when they 
are confronted with considerations which compete with one another.42 For example, when 
a remote region characterised by significant unemployment levels is impacted by a merger, 
it is unclear whether the competition authorities are in the best position to establish what 
economic consequences (be they direct or indirect) which result from the merger will be 
experienced in this region.43 The Act does not entirely ignore such deficiencies, in that it 
acknowledges that with regards to bank mergers, it is possible that competition authorities 
are not in the best position to make these decisions: the Minister of Finance is empowered 
by the Act to issue a notice excluding the merger from the jurisdiction of the Competition 
Act.44 This serves as an official recognition by the legislature that the competition 
authorities are not always the best bodies to see that public interest is served, although this 
is limited to bank mergers as a specified exception.45  
However, a contrary perception could be that through these public interest provisions, the 
state can use competition law and its institutions as an additional means for achieving its 
objectives.46 More recent South African merger cases seem to support a shift in attitudes 
which is aligned with such an approach.47 
                                                          
39 Supra note 1 at 3. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42  Gal, M, Presentation entitled 'Reality Bites (or Bits): The Political Economy of Antitrust in Small Economies', 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute's 28th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (2001) 
October 25 & 26, at 13. 
43 Supra note 1 at 4. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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2. Significant merger cases involving public interest considerations: 
The Wal-Mart/Massmart merger is particularly salient. A proposed merger of Wal-Mart 
Stores Inc. and Massmart Holdings Limited, despite causing controversy and being met with 
extensive resistance, was ultimately approved by the Competition Appeal Court (CAC).48 
However, this approval had been heavily opposed by multiple intervening parties who had 
attempted to obstruct the merger: the Minister of Economic Development (the "Ministers"), 
the Minister of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, the Minister of Trade and Industry; the 
South African Small Medium and Micro Enterprises Forum; and unions (FAWU, SACCAWU, 
and NUMSA).49  
The primary concern of the Ministers was how the logistical capabilities of the global 
procurement network which Wal-Mart operates would affect South African imports.50 
According to the Ministers’ submissions, local producers would be threatened by low-cost 
foreign producers situated in Asia, with the merger resulting in procurement shifting from 
the former to the latter.51 The Ministers argued that the consequences of such a 
procurement shift would be the stifling of domestic industries’ development, and 
widespread closure of small and medium sized businesses, along with a detrimental impact 
on employment.52  
The CAC remained cognizant of the relevant public interest concerns implicated by the 
merger, despite having approved it, and expressly stated: 
“The introduction of the largest retailer in the world to the South African economy may 
pose significant challenges for the participation of South African producers in global value 
chains which, as the evidence indicates within the retailing sector, is dominated by Wal-
Mart.  Failure to engage meaningfully with the implications of this challenge posed by 
globalisation can well have detrimental economic and social effects for the South African 
economy in general and small and medium sized business in particular”.53 
                                                          
48 Supra note 1 at 4 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Supra note 6 at 158.  
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The CAC emphasised the incorporation in our Competition Act of public interest 
considerations that are distinct, clear and obligatory: competition authorities must apply 
them.54 However, in this case, the CAC believed they had not been applied effectively.55   
The CAC further elucidated their position: 
“Given Wal-Mart’s size and expertise... the proposal for a condition which would seek to 
enhance the participation of South African small and medium size producers in particular, in 
global value chains which are dominated by Wal-Mart so as to prevent job losses, at the 
least, and, at best, to increase both employment and economic activity of these businesses 
protected under s 12 A must form part of the considerations which this Court is required to 
take into account in considering a merger of this nature… This flows from the model of 
competition law chosen by the legislature and in particular as set out in s 12 A.  It also forms 
part of the mandate given to the Tribunal and, on appeal, to this Court when faced with the 
inquiry as to whether a merger should be approved”.56 
The conditions that had been imposed by the Competition Tribunal were thoroughly 
evaluated by the CAC, namely the condition that local suppliers be assisted through the 
establishment of a procurement fund.57 The CAC was disparaging of the formulation of this 
condition, regarding it as inadequately interrogated.58 The CAC made an order to the effect 
that the merging parties, along with the government and unions, must nominate experts 
who would be responsible for conducting a study determining the “most appropriate means 
together with the mechanisms by which local South African suppliers may be empowered to 
respond to the challenges posed by the merger and thus benefit thereby”.59  
With regards to concerns pertaining to maintaining employment, the Tribunal’s approach 
had been to order that when employment opportunities became available, the merged 
entity must give a preferential right to these positions to the 503 employees who had 
suffered retrenchment in June 2010.60 This response was viewed as entirely inadequate by 
                                                          
54 Supra note 1 at 5. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Supra note 6 at 162. 
57 Supra note 1 at 5. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Supra note 6 at 109. 
60 Supra note 1 at 6. 
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the CAC, which issued an order reinstating these employees – this was a necessary measure 
as the CAC, when examining the merger and these retrenchments, had identified a sufficient 
causal connection between these.61 The CAC was still not satisfied, however, and therefore 
elected to impose further employment-specific conditions: that there be a two year 
moratorium on retrenchments which result from the merged entity’s operational 
requirements; and that the merged entity must honour its current labour agreements, as 
well as its existing bargaining practices with SACCAWU, the largest representative union.62  
In Metropolitan/Momentum, the Competition Tribunal addressed labour regulation 
extensively, on account of its public interest nature.63 Labour itself insisted that this 
occurred, as opposed to the government intervening.64 The merging parties proposed that, 
in the three years immediately subsequent to the merger being implemented, there would 
be an upper limit of 1000 job losses that were related to the merger.65 They further 
proposed that an offer of support be included, which covered “core skills training to 
affected unskilled and semi-skilled employees, outplacement support and counselling, and 
to use their best endeavours to redeploy affected employees within the merged entity”.66 
The Competition Commission viewed these conditions as acceptable, recommending an 
approval of the merger subject to the implementation of the merging parties’ agreed-upon 
support measures.67  
NEHAWU, a minority union comprising 6% of Momentum’s employees, argued that the 
merging entities had not satisfactorily substantiated how this particular number of 
acceptable retrenchments (1000) had been calculated and deemed appropriate.68 NEHAWU 
further challenged the legitimacy of this 1000 retrenchments figure, arguing that 
inadequate justification had been provided for why any job losses were necessary at all.69 
                                                          
61 Supra note 1 at 6. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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Consequently, the union pursued an order prohibiting the merger, or in the event of it being 
approved, that this merger would occur with no jobs being lost.70  
The response of the Competition Tribunal was to approve the merger, making this subject to 
the condition that for two years following the effective date of the transaction, zero 
retrenchments should result from the merger (with senior managers being an exception).71 
The Tribunal further voiced its scepticism with regards to addressing redundancy concerns 
with “soft” initiatives, emphasising that re-skilling and redeployment had a tendency to be 
ineffective in the Tribunal’s experience.72  
The Tribunal went on to elevate the status of employment within public interest 
considerations, stating that if the merging parties neglected to address how the transaction 
affected the employment sector, then even mergers which would serve to increase 
competition could be prohibited.73  
The notion of connecting loss of jobs and efficiencies is the landmark characteristic of this 
case.74 The Tribunal identifies in their assessment of the facts that it is necessary to precisely 
articulate the process followed to determine the loss of employment figures that the 
merging parties were submitting as acceptable, as well as the need to establish and make 
explicit the link between these proposed figures and public (not private) efficiencies which 
are anticipated to follow the merger.75 In conclusion, the Tribunal noted the merging 
parties’ failure to demonstrate “a rational connection between the efficiencies sought from 
the merger and the job losses claimed to be necessary”.76 The Tribunal further remarked 
that it was only when the potential loss of jobs was of a significant magnitude, that it 
became necessary to adopt a considered approach of this nature.77  
There needs to be a clear connection between the efficiencies to be gained and the negative 
public impact that is envisaged – there could be no arbitrary condonation of such a negative 
                                                          
70 Supra note 1 at 6. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid at 7. 
74 Supra note 12 at 5. 
75 Ibid at 6. 
76 Supra note 4 at 92. 
77 Supra note 12 at 6. 
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impact in the absence of this nexus being made evident.78 Efficiencies by themselves are 
insufficient to justify a prejudicial effect on employment.79 Parties continue to be obliged to 
demonstrate that there are justifications of a public nature which would allow for these 
employment losses – these reasons need to be public in order to offset interest that the 
public has in the preservation of jobs.80 
Kansai/Freeworld involved a hostile takeover on the part of Kansai (a coatings 
manufacturer) over Freeworld (a performance and decorative coatings manufacturer and 
distributer).81 The merger was approved by the Commission, provided that certain public 
interest and welfare conditions be met, namely: “(1) no merger related retrenchments for a 
period of three years (includes the inability to redeploy); (2) Kansai will divest of Freeworld's 
entire automotive coatings business; (3) Kansai will continue to manufacture decorative 
coatings for 10 years; (4) Kansai will invest in research and development in decorative 
coatings in South Africa; (5) Kansai will implement a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
deal within two years of approval; and (6) Kansai will establish an automotive coatings 
manufacturing facility in South Africa within 5 years.”82 
Kansai found the divestiture condition particularly dissatisfactory, and responded with a 
request for consideration which alleged that this divestiture condition had been imposed 
based on incorrect findings made by the Commission.83 The Commission initially opposed 
this request for consideration.84  
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) applied successfully for rights to intervene.85 
The DTI had made several public interest and welfare related submissions regarding this 
merger to the Commission, prior to these formal intervention proceedings.86 The content of 
these preceding submissions claimed that, because Freeworld was the sole manufacturer of 
automotive coatings that supplied to the domestic automotive industry, the take-over 
                                                          
78 Supra note 12 at 6. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid at 7. 
81 Supra note 1 at 7.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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would present a direct threat to the government’s localisation initiative.87 The DTI was 
concerned that employment levels would suffer if Kansai reduced or ceased entirely to 
locally manufacture automotive coatings.88 The DTI also expressed concern that there would 
be a detrimental impact on innovation markets if the merger were to occur, as Freeworld 
developed unique South African automotive coatings products.89 The final concern of the 
DTI was that Freeworld would cease to hold its essential BEE character if the merger were to 
be concluded – especially as Freeworld was considered to be an “exemplar with respect to 
black economic empowerment”.90 The DTI adamantly stated that rather than being opposed 
to it, they recognised the necessary and important role of foreign direct investment in 
increasing competition which would lead to the development of local industry and the 
economy – this would be a positive step towards addressing the structural weaknesses 
confronted by our system.91 
Ultimately the DTI opted to withdraw from its intervention, in spite of it having actively 
participated in the initial merger review stages, as it was satisfied that its concerns would be 
adequately represented by the Commission to the Tribunal.92 The Commission and the 
merging parties then entered into negotiations, which culminated in the withdrawal of the 
divestiture condition, along with the condition that automotive coatings be locally 
manufactured.93 These were substituted with behavioural conditions relating to toll 
manufacturing fees and flows of information.94  
The Tribunal asserted in Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 
Limited95 that mergers which are not anti-competitive could still be prohibited on account of 
public interest considerations, and such public interest considerations could also serve to 
redeem an anti-competitive merger.96 
                                                          
87 Supra note 1 at 7. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid at 8. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 (08/LM/Feb/02) [2003] ZACT 36 (18 June 2003). 
96 Supra note 12 at 11. 
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Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Gold Fields Limited97 provided a valuable 
summary of the Tribunal’s interpretation of the role that public interest considerations play: 
“all that it needs to establish, having found as we have earlier that it will not have a likely 
anti-competitive effect, is that the merger will not have a substantial negative effect on the 
public interest”.98 The Tribunal’s emphasis was that when analysing a merger, an 
assessment of public interest grounds will be secondary to the primary evaluation of the 
effect on competition.99 A merger which does not pass the competition test may still be 
approved after applying the public interest test; and mergers may still be prohibited for 
failing to pass the public interest test despite satisfying the competition test.100  
3. The issue of onus: 
When a substantial public interest concern has been raised, the burden of proof will fall on 
the merging parties, according to the Tribunal in Metropolitan/Momentum: i.e. raising 
public interest grounds of a substantial nature that would serve to support the merger being 
prohibited, will result in a shift of the evidential burden onto these merging parties.101 This 
principle is not necessarily generally applicable, however, as the Tribunal had a limited 
scope which applied to the particular facts at hand: when the employment losses would be 
substantia 
 l and re-employment prospects were not promising.102 The confines of principles relating to 
onus were elaborated on in the Wal-Mart/Massmart merger: public interest impact claims 
require substantiation, be it in the form of oral or documentary evidence which would need 
to be sufficiently particular to the issue at hand, and there would need to be further 
evidence provided which would support how any potential effects being alleged were 
established.103 The Tribunal conceived the evidentiary test as involving proof that the 
process followed for deciding how many retrenchments may occur is reasonable, and that 
“the public interest in preventing employment loss is balanced by an equally weighty, but 
                                                          
97 (93/LM/NOV04) [2005] ZACT (18 May 2005). 
98 Ibid at 61. 
99 Supra note 12 at 12. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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countervailing public interest, justifying the job loss and which is cognizable under the 
Act.”104 It would be inadequate to counter job losses by raising efficiency grounds.105 
Countervailing grounds used to justify such job losses would need to be of a public nature: 
considerations of private efficiency gains would be excluded.106  
4. Balancing public interest factors and the principle of merger-
specificity: 
A case may present conflicting public interest factors, as recognised in Distillers Corporation 
(SA) Limited and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Limited, where a specific region may benefit 
whilst employment is prejudicially effected: this case considered sacrificing a substantial 
number of jobs in order to prevent the closure of a factory which was of significant 
economic value to a region.107 Such sentiments were echoed in Harmony Gold where the 
Tribunal noted that different public interest factors may point to opposing conclusions: a 
loss of employment may be necessary in order to establish a national champion through a 
merger.108 Thus the Tribunal’s task inherently involves an attempt to establish the net 
impact on the public interest by balancing potentially conflicting factors.109 Negative public 
interest effects were coupled with enhanced consumer welfare outcomes in the Wal-
Mart/Massmart merger, which necessitated that the issue of balancing be addressed.110 The 
positive consumer welfare effects that would result from the merger were not disputed: 
vulnerable consumers would surely benefit from the resultant lower prices.111 These welfare 
effects, however, would need to be weighed against the threat to local industries that this 
merger would present.112 This would require a strict application of the law to the case’s 
particular facts: a balancing act which is informed by the factual context at hand.113 The 
public interest as an abstract cause must not be pursued by competition authorities in a 
broad, open-ended fashion – rather only those public interest considerations that are 
                                                          
104 Supra note 4 at 70. 
105 Supra note 12 at 13. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid at 14. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
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specifically implicated by a merger should be addressed.114 Merger-specificity is paramount 
when the public interest is assessed during a competition evaluation, and any balancing 
must be guided by this principle.115 This was made explicit by the Tribunal: “Subject matter 
and substantiality are not the only limitations in considering public interest. A further 
consideration is that the public interest must be merger specific. Expressed in less technical 
language, unless the merger is the cause of the public interest concerns, we have no remit 
to do anything about them. Our job in merger control is not to make the world a better 
place, only to prevent it becoming worse as a result of a specific transaction”.116 
The Tribunal articulated its cognizance of the limitations on the scope of its public interest 
mandate, whilst accepting that it is responsible for protecting labour rights as they currently 
exist: 
“Whilst in this case protecting existing collective rights is a legitimate concern that our 
public interest mandate allows us to intervene on because we are protecting existing rights 
from the apprehension that they may be eroded post-merger, we must be careful how far 
down this path we go. Protecting existing rights is legitimate, creating new rights is beyond 
our competence”.117 
The process for determining conditions designed to alleviate any potentially negative impact 
on the public interest is of central focus in this case.118 Intervening parties must only 
propose “appropriate, proportional and enforceable” remedies.119 
5. The legitimacy of intervening in the public interest: 
The phenomenon of active use of competition law by the government in order to achieve 
policy objectives is relatively recent.120 Ensuring that jobs are preserved during mergers has 
often been the primary concern in public interest considerations, as evident in the cases 
discussed above, but it is arguably socio-politically narrow and myopic for labour to 
                                                          
114 Supra note 12 at 14. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Walmart Stores Inc v Massmart Holdings Ltd (73/LM/Dec10) [2011] ZACT 28 (31 May 2011) at 32. 
117 Supra note 116 at 68.  
118 Supra note 12 at 14. 
119 Supra note 116 at 121.  
120 Supra note 1 at 8. 
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intervene with support from authorities in the way that it has.121 “The politically effective 
group” – those individuals who are already employed – have their interests protected, 
whilst broader, more pressing goals such as sustainable, long-term job creation along with 
the achievement of an efficient market are neglected.122  
In spite of the merging parties submitting that there would not be a direct negative impact 
on employment resulting from the merger (with an increase in employment being more 
likely to occur in practice), the government still opted to support employment-related 
conditions in Wal-Mart/Massmart.123 It is argued by Lewis that the real underlying 
motivator for the state intervening in this way is that employment levels in local 
manufacturing would decline due to a foreign acquiring firm shifting its procurement 
offshore.124 Industrial policy was effectively being implemented through competition 
institutions: the decisive considerations were how foreign direct investment would affect 
domestic industries, rather than the direct impact of the transaction on target and acquiring 
firms’ levels of employment.125 The government appears to be preoccupied with how local 
procurement is effected and the ownership of local firms by foreign companies – this is 
indicative of an “industrialisation” policy, which exceeds the defined ambit of public interest 
considerations as contemplated by the Competition Act.126   
The government intervening as it did in Wal-Mart/Massmart and Kansai/Freeworld could 
arguably be seen as arbitrary, which may suggest that government is conceiving competition 
law as a surrogate for trade or industrial policy.127 This is manifestly problematic and an 
unsound approach to public policy, as industrial policy is not being applied to the economy 
as a whole as it should be – it is being applied in each individual merger case.128 Government 
intervention of this nature introduces significant uncertainty, as there appears to be 
arbitrary inclusion of the values of this apparent “industrialisation” policy, over and above 
the frequent employment considerations.129   
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Prior to these relatively recent merger decisions, government intervention was minimal, 
which could reflect the practical realisation that public interest objectives may be more 
effectively secured by competition authorities or other agencies and statutes.130 The state 
intervening in the processes of competition law in an apparently arbitrary nature, which has 
characterised recent cases, could be a symptom of the sector regulatory process performing 
poorly.131 The legitimate public purposes which underlie the establishment of regulatory 
agencies are often frustrated due to mismanagement, according to Posner.132 The state has 
thus turned to the competition authorities in order to realise its objectives.133 Arbitrary 
government intervention could more simply be explained as indicating that the government 
views competition law and its institutions as policy implementation tools.134 If such a stance 
is accepted, the government has clearly failed to develop a comprehensive competition and 
industrial policy due to uncertainty, arbitrariness and a lack of transparency.135  
6. The tension between efficiency and equity: 
Achieving more equitable allocation of resources is a fundamental aim of the public interest 
provisions established by the Act, which is a progressive addition to the traditional 
competition law notions of efficiency and welfare.136 However, with the reallocation of 
resources, the incentives faced by individuals and firms are altered and competitive 
outcome efficiencies become distorted.137 Value judgements are inherent in the very nature 
of notions of equity – such value judgements are generally suggestive of political 
objectives.138 There are thus far-reaching implications within the market being targeted, 
related markets and the economy as a whole with regards to income distribution, efficiency 
and welfare, when a merged entity has public interest conditions imposed on it.139 There is a 
well-established and generally accepted trade-off between efficiency and equity.140 With 
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government intervention comes the alteration of incentives for firms, which although may 
be aimed at improving equity, arguably also results in distortion of choices and sacrificed 
efficiency.141  
The competition authorities used a consumer welfare standard in order to assess the 
merger in Wal-Mart/Massmart.142 Wal-Mart’s ability to run a markedly efficient logistics 
operation would make production more efficient and decrease prices, which would benefit 
consumers.143 Efficiencies in production mean lowered costs, with these cost savings being 
passed on to consumers who enjoy decreased product prices and greater allocative 
efficiency.144 Consumer surplus will increase as the price begins to approach marginal 
cost.145 The gain in consumer surplus is partly due to local producer surplus decreasing, and 
partly due to the total surplus increasing.146 Domestic producer surplus is eroded when local 
firms fail to compete with the cheaper price of imports: as a result, domestic firms may be 
forced to reduce output or even close.147 However, cheaper imports will result in the total 
surplus increasing, with lowered prices of goods, and a consequent increase in consumer 
consumption.148  
However, this analysis still fails to capture the nuance and subtle interplay between 
potential consequences flowing from the merger in Wal-Mart/Massmart: local producers – 
provided that they attain efficiency – would be provided with the opportunity to supply to 
new markets following Wal-Mart’s entry into the domestic market, and local firms could 
thus experience growth.149  
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7. Limiting retrenchments and re-deployment strategically to 
maintain employment: 
It is salient to note that creating jobs and protecting jobs are distinct notions.150 Efficiency 
and welfare are implicated when conditions are imposed on mergers which serve to prohibit 
retrenchments.151 Merging parties will face higher costs when they are not allowed to 
allocate their labour in a way which maximises efficiency: production costs rise, in the 
absence of any corresponding output increase.152 The firm’s production is less efficient and 
the waste of resources is evident.153 There is a reduction in the consumer surplus and 
allocative efficiency that the merger would have created, with costs being passed on to 
consumers in the form of increased prices.154  
Conditions relating to retrenchments and re-employment essentially function in order to 
temporarily protect jobs that will not ultimately be secured; this is coupled with the costs 
associated with retaining redundant employees (which operate in many ways like an 
indirect tax on the owners of these firms).155 Households, individuals, tax transfers and 
pension funds are just some of the broad range of groups to which these firms’ profits are 
distributed.156 There are likely to be far-reaching distributional effects flowing from the 
distortion created by conditions.157 Conditions in this form therefore offer short-term job 
protection, with a temporary redistribution of wealth from the firm to labour: consumers 
will suffer as a result of this, as will the various recipients of a firm’s rents.158 Re-deployment 
conditions will also compromise productive efficiency.159 
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8. Substantiality: 
Enhancing consumer welfare is the fundamental focus of competition regulation.160 
Consumers benefit through lower prices due to rivalry between competitors, there is an 
increase in output, and an encouragement of innovation.161 Thus the broad public interest is 
served by traditional conceptions of competition.162 Despite this, the introduction of public 
interest factors in the Act potentially creates a paradox.163 By focusing on protecting 
employment - particularly when the jobs being lost are a result of synergies between 
merged firms which increase efficiency - the efficiency of the merged firm will be 
decreased.164 A decrease in competition, higher prices, and less innovation will all be 
associated knock-on effects.165 The competitive analysis is undermined through making 
public interest a priority in this particular way, and the traditional competition policy 
objective of advancing the broad “public interest” is detrimentally affected.166  
However, when analysing mergers, it is desirable, perhaps even necessary, to permit 
evaluating competition law and public interest issues simultaneously.167 If entirely separate 
authorities decided these distinct issues, extensive lobbying would be encouraged, which 
would lack the transparent and open character needed by our unified process – this was 
observed by David Lewis in May 2002.168 Conditions are imposed when necessary, using a 
single forum and following a holistic inquiry.169 In the absence of such an approach, there 
would be a wholly uncoordinated consideration of the issues.170  
There is an unequivocal requirement in our Act which would serve to trigger these public 
interest issues becoming relevant within the sphere of competition law: they need to be 
“substantial”.171 However, strict adherence to this principle has not been followed in recent 
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cases: investigations can be sparked by even a single retrenchment, with the possibility of 
conditions being imposed.172  
Aon/Glenrand173 involved job losses, following a merger, which occurred as a result of 
duplicated roles: an estimated job loss of 220 employees out of 1500.174 However, there 
were some highly skilled employees being retrenched who had strong prospects of finding a 
new job.175 The Commission disregarded these considerations and nonetheless 
recommended that the approval of the merger be conditional on retrenchments being 
limited as follows: employees with an income of under R30 000 per month should be 
exempt from retrenchment.176 This condition would in effect see the merged entity become 
entirely uncompetitive, with an inefficient base of employees that would cost much more 
than its rivals.177 Upon request, the Competition Tribunal reconsidered and narrowed this: 
for a period of two years, retrenchment of employees earning below R15 000 would be 
prohibited, and there would be a revised cap on retrenchments of 24 employees earning 
between R15 000 and R30 000.178 In order to resolve the issue, the merging parties had 
tendered this, however at most 54 employees were affected according to Aon’s forecasts.179 
Glencore/Xstrata180 involved a conditional approval of the transaction: a maximum of 80 
unskilled and semi-skilled worker retrenchments, and that the total retrenchments that 
could ultimately be caused by the merger could not exceed 100 – these conditions were to 
be met within 90 days of the date on which the antitrust arrangement was approved.181  
These cases clearly involve public interest issues where the substantiality of these is highly 
questionable.182 Answering the question of substantiality is contingent on whether a single 
transaction context is used to assess this (the affected proportion of the merging parties’ 
employees), or whether the impact that the transaction has on the economy in its entirety is 
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being assessed.183 A total societal welfare approach was adopted in Wal-Mart/Massmart: 
positive consumer welfare effects flowing from the merger would need to be balanced 
against any potential prejudice to the public interest.184 The market as a whole must be 
looked at to determine consumer welfare, therefore if one wants to accurately compare job 
losses to this, the jobs being lost must be assessed in terms of their impact on the whole 
economy.185 
The Tribunal chose to protect 100 jobs in Glencore/Xstrata, but they failed to take 
cognizance of the fact that thousands of jobs are lost each month in this particular sector.186 
Obviously one should not dismiss each employee’s individual suffering as trivial, but when 
looking at the context of the economy broadly, the scale of jobs lost proves to be 
insignificant, the impact cannot be said to be substantial, and imposing public interest 
conditions would be exceeding the scope of the competition authorities’ mandate.187 Broad 
competition objectives would be compromised (which themselves function to further the 
public interest) if only a few retrenchments could justify a merger being prohibited.188 This is 
not to say that retrenched employees are left with no remedies available to them: the 
procedural and substantive fairness of their rights are protected by labour law, in the event 
of their dismissal.189 
The question of whether competition authorities are the appropriate bodies to address 
public interest issues is inextricably bound with the question of whether the test being 
applied is appropriate.190 Only when the correct test is being applied – that is, being 
curtailed by considerations of substantiality – is it appropriate for competition authorities to 
grapple with public interest issues.191 When the public interest issues implicated are 
insubstantial (such as the retrenchment of a handful of employees), there are other, better-
equipped forums available to tackle these.192   
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9. A Global Comparison: A look into international approaches and 
trends in including public interest factors in antitrust merger 
control 
It is valuable to reflect on how several jurisdictions have increased their focus on public 
interest factors in merger reviews in recent years.193 The legitimacy of the role of public 
interest policy considerations in merger reviews has vexed foreign jurisdictions.194 Certainty, 
timeliness and transparency - for all stakeholders in the merger review process - are 
generally accepted principles that are valued and widely proposed as worthy of being 
upheld.195 The crux of the issue is whether such general propositions are consistent with a 
consideration of public interest in the merger review process.196 
Mergers are not in and of themselves detrimental to consumers or the economy as a 
whole.197 Rather, they can often maximise welfare by facilitating improved efficiency in the 
allocation of scarce resources.198 From the perspective of economic stability, merger control 
focuses on mergers which result in the merged firm having enhanced incentives or ability to 
exercise market power, which is likely to harm competition.199 This can occur through rival 
firms co-ordinating with one another or unilaterally.200 The end result is slower innovation, 
reduced quality, or prices increasing above a level which is competitive for a significant 
period of time.201  
The International Competition Network (ICN) states in its Recommended Practices for 
Merger Analysis: 
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 “The legal framework for competition law merger review should focus exclusively on 
identifying and preventing or remedying anticompetitive mergers.  A merger review law 
should not be used to pursue other goals”.202 
Standard economic theory would suggest that in nearly all circumstances consumers benefit 
from the existence of competitive markets, as the competitive process ought to ensure that 
there is an efficient allocation of scarce resources through competitive markets, with goods 
and services that are competitively priced being delivered.203 Quantifying and addressing 
public interest factors is significantly more challenging with regards to how these can be 
attained through market forces.204 Considerations of this nature tend to vary over time and 
involve complicated public policy assessments, making them all the more challenging to 
grapple with.205 Examples of public interest factors which have come to international 
attention in these sorts of considerations are: defence and national security, social and 
welfare outcomes, and socially or politically motivated media diversity.206  
Despite the issues which arise with applying non-competition public interest factors in 
practice, these factors are still included in the merger review processes of several 
jurisdictions.207 Due to the questionable desirability and difficulty of application of such 
policies, it is vital to clearly articulate and differentiate the public interest factors being 
taken into account in a manner which does not hinder timeous and transparent 
consideration of competition conditions.208  
The salient question which arises is whether the core policy of merger control – that 
mergers “do not jeopardize conditions for competition” – is consistent with including public 
interest factors in merger reviews.209 The ICN Recommended Practices for Merger 
Notification Procedures states that: 
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“If a jurisdiction’s merger test includes consideration of non-competition factors, the way in 
which the competition and non-competition considerations interact should also be made 
transparent.”210 
There is a trend developing which sees broad public interest considerations intruding in 
merger control.211 There should be a clear articulation of any public interest considerations 
which are included, when merger control goes further than meeting the economic 
objectives of enhanced consumer welfare and resource allocation efficiency.212 This is 
essential in order to consider these public interest considerations alongside competition 
policy’s core values.213  
Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulations (EUMR), permits EU member states to take 
appropriate measures (which must be compatible with the general principles and other 
provisions of EU law) to protect “legitimate public interests” that the EUMR does not 
currently take into consideration.214 Therefore, member states have some freedom to 
include public interest considerations in their merger review processes, but any measures 
taken to this effect must remain non-protectionist, and principles like the freedom of 
movement of capital, and the operation of the EU internal market, must not be 
undermined.215  
There are three legitimate public interests provided in Article 21(4) of the EUMR, namely 
plurality of the media, public security, and prudential rules (relevant with regards to 
financial services).216 
The UK’s 2002 Enterprise Act (as amended) similarly permits intervention in mergers by the 
UK Secretary of State when these mergers do not fall within the EUMR’s jurisdiction and an 
“exceptional public interest” may be adversely affected, such as the UK financial system’s 
stability, media plurality, or national security.217 High profile pharmaceutical sector mergers 
that have recently occurred internationally sparked debate as to whether UK legislation 
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should include a public interest test to empower the UK Competition and Markets 
Authority, in relation to EU mergers, to invoke broader legitimate public interests – which 
would go further than Article 21 of the EUMR’s three expressly recognised interests.218   
South Africa’s Competition Act appears to provide more extensively for public interest 
considerations in the assessment of mergers, relative to most foreign jurisdictions, by 
including considerations of “employment, the ability of small businesses or those owned by 
previously disadvantaged individuals to compete, international competitiveness of domestic 
firms and the impact of a merger on an industrial sector or region”.219 With the recent 
release of the draft Guidelines for the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Mergers 
(“Draft Guidelines”), South Africa’s Competition Commission has sought to shed light on 
how these considerations are to be realised in practice.220  
The Draft Guidelines background note recognises the growing international trend towards 
increased inclusion of public interest considerations in merger review processes and the 
need for clarity as to how to apply this in practice: 
“There is a surge of competition authorities, particularly on the African continent, with a 
public interest mandate in merger regulation; South Africa is not alone on this path.  It is 
therefore imperative to determine the contours of the public interest in merger regulation 
for policy certainty.”221 
When it comes to how South Africa’s Competition Commission may address considerations 
relating to employment generally, and particularly the data that should be provided when 
considering this factor, the Draft Guidelines provide useful commentary.222 Despite this, the 
issue of balancing or weighting of public interest considerations as a whole remains unclear, 
with limited guidance being provided by the Draft Guidelines.223  
                                                          
218 Supra note 193. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
27 
 
Broader public interest considerations for merger reviews is highlighted as significant due to 
the prominence of these jurisdictions and the public debate within these jurisdictions which 
has been sparked by recent high profile mergers.224  
When considering broader public interest issues, a salient question presents itself 
independently of any comparisons between these international jurisdictions: how these 
public interest considerations would be balanced against competition based factors; 
determining what weight should be given to any particular public interest factor and how to 
assess the balancing of these against the traditional competition factors – looking at a 
merger’s negative and positive impacts.225 Assessing and quantifying these presents a 
substantial challenge.226 This can be illustrated through the example of attempting to weigh 
efficiency considerations (a competition factor) against employment factors of a positive or 
negative nature.227 The challenge becomes all the more pronounced when looking at the 
imposition of remedies, as there is a more heavy focus on competition issues remedies than 
there is on public interest considerations in merger matters.228 Assessing the economic 
impact of public interest considerations becomes problematic, and as these considerations 
are substantively very different to competition factors, should remedies addressing these be 
behavioural, structural or limited in time?229 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether competition authorities are in the best position to 
assess issues that are of a non-competition nature.230 In the UK, consideration of public 
interest in mergers is initiated and undertaken by the Secretary of State – should other 
government departments or agencies such as this address these public interest issues?231 
This is a particularly significant issue when the public interest consideration in question does 
not involve economic factors which independent competition regulators engaging in merger 
review typically consider, but rather involve express consideration of factors which are 
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political or qualitative in relation to the effect on a certain society that a merger may 
have.232  
The inclusion of public interest factors in competition based merger review may involve an 
inherent tension, however, in spite of this, merger control regimes quite commonly include 
this as an element.233 Transparency and a clear articulation is thus vital when grappling with 
public interest considerations.234 With merger transactions becoming increasingly cross-
border in their nature, this imperative becomes especially vital, with competition 
practitioners being required to look at how public interest operates in several 
jurisdictions.235 There will be increased accountability, leading to more timely and 
appropriate merger assessment (which is more likely to be consistent with merger control’s 
overarching economic objective), if these public interest considerations are well-articulated 
and transparent.236  
In merger review processes, taking non-economic factors into account in the form of broad 
public interest factors, creates uncertainty in the assessment of merger control processes.237 
The ICN Merger Recommended Practices may continue to serve as useful touchstones and 
guidance for both governments and competition agencies, when attempting to ascertain 
what the best practices for merger reviews are, being cognizant of the emphasis on 
transparent, efficient and timely merger assessments.238  
10. Looking beyond mergers: Public interest considerations during 
prohibited conduct assessment 
Hillel captures, albeit indirectly, the inherent friction existing between public interests - 
motivated by socio-economic and political considerations as well as communal notions of 
altruism – and competition law or policy which has the private interest of economic 
efficiency as an ultimate objective.239 However, despite these being distinct points of 
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departure, the maximisation of consumer welfare is still the ultimate aim of competition 
law/policy and public interest.240  
Similar to legislation in other developing nations, the South African Competition Act seeks to 
incorporate competition principles that could be described as orthodox along with 
considerations of a public interest nature.241 The Act prominently features public interest, 
with this concept being woven into various parts.242 The Act’s preamble explicitly 
acknowledges the political history of South Africa and the injustices which still exist as a 
legacy of this.243 Taking cognizance of this, the Act states that its objectives include 
“providing all South Africans with equal opportunity to participate in the economy and 
regulating the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public interest”.244 
Furthermore, the Act seeks to maintain and promote competition in order to “promote 
employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all South Africans; to enable 
small and medium sized enterprises (“SME”) to participate in the economy; and to promote 
a wider ownership spread, particularly in relation to historically disadvantaged persons.”245 
Taking public interest factors into account is an obligatory requirement that the 
Competition Authorities are tasked with when assessing mergers and acquisitions that are 
proposed, such as how a proposed merger could potentially impact employment.246 The Act 
also explicitly incorporates public interest considerations as a ground for exempting conduct 
that would otherwise be anticompetitive from having the Act apply to it, in the assessment 
of exemption applications.247 This however is specifically limited to situations where firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons or SMEs have their ability to 
become competitive promoted by the otherwise anticompetitive conduct.248  
However, when assessing prohibited conduct, it is unclear whether the authorities are 
obliged to consider the public interest factors enshrined in the Act’s objectives and 
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preamble, and if so to what extent they should do so.249 The present predicament is such 
that a sizeable body of jurisprudence has been developed by the Authorities exclusively in 
relation to merger control, regarding the “balancing act” to be undertaken between 
orthodox competition law and public interest tests.250 When assessing prohibited conduct, 
there is an absence of guiding policy, limited guiding jurisprudence, and the Act is silent on 
public interest incorporation.251  
It becomes salient to consider whether during the assessment of prohibited conduct (like 
abuse of dominance) public interest as captured in the objectives and preamble of the Act, 
should be taken into account by the Authorities.252 Answering this question requires an 
evaluation of the interplay between competition law/policy and the public interest, as well 
as an understanding of what the “public interest” really means.253 These questions must be 
approached through reviewing the economic and political context which motivated the 
inclusion in our Act of these public interest considerations.254 Competition legislation 
incorporation of public interest in various jurisdictions, such as our African counterparts, the 
USA and the UK should also be considered.255 It is useful to examine South African abuse of 
dominance cases which considered public interest either directly or indirectly, and attempt 
to ascertain lessons from these.256  
a. Public interest theory and its interface with competition law and policy:  
Public interest is an ambiguous concept, as evident in its varying definition in legal and 
economic literature, with each country conceiving it their own way and depending on the 
application for which it is intended.257 That being said, socio-economic and political 
imperatives would always inform the concept of public interest.258 The abundant definitions 
attached to public interest are acknowledged by Leslie (2012), who notes that they reflect 
one’s particular political stances as well as considerations of an economic nature such as 
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access to goods and services of quality that are affordable.259 Leslie furthermore 
characterises competition law as a kind of public interest law.260 This is not a novel concept 
in economic literature, and Leslie states that both economic and political arguments would 
support such a characterisation.261  
As early as 1966, Bork conducted an analysis of competition law’s origins which concluded 
that consumer protection was the underlying premise behind the passing of the Sherman 
Act, and that the Congressional Record clearly reflected this legislative intent.262 Posner 
(2001) posits that antitrust legislation in America throughout the 20th century was 
responding to populist concerns relating to small business survival and the distribution of 
income.263 However, private interests were also recognised as being influential in the origins 
of competition policy and law, by DiLorenzo (1985) and Boudreaux and DiLorenzo (1993).264 
The United States Supreme Court espouses such sentiments, stating that: “Antitrust laws in 
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are 
as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as 
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the 
freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to 
compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic 
muscle it can muster.”265  
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the vital public role that competition law and policy 
plays, implicitly acknowledges that vigorous competition, and the resultant economic 
efficiency, serves the public interest.266 Posner (2001) in fact argues that the sole goal of 
competition law is economic efficiency.267 Leslie (2012) would concur, seeing that it is in the 
public interest to have improved consumer welfare which is achieved through competitive 
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outcomes such as increased innovation and quality, and reduced prices of goods and 
services.268 UNCTAD (2011) adopts a slightly different conception of competition policy and 
law, viewing them together as aspects of a suite of economic development policies which 
are available to countries, especially developing nations.269 Prohibited conduct could 
arguably be seen as having an impact on economic growth and development due to the 
restriction of competition that it results and the deterioration of consumer welfare as prices 
increase and barriers to entry are created, arising in concerns pertaining to innovation and 
efficiency.270 This view implicitly recognises that in these countries competition policy and 
law will in all likelihood capture objectives relating to other developmental policy which 
would generally be considered as being in the public interest.271 The need to weigh public 
interest concerns against those of economic efficiency is cautioned by UNCTAD (2008), 
noting that this should be done in the best way possible considering that “it may be difficult 
to coordinate between the government’s objective of promoting public interest and 
competition authority’s objective of promoting efficient markets”.272  
In his study of the role that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had in promotion of the 
public interest, Posner (1969) discovered that the FTC lacked any significant positive 
contribution.273 Posner concluded that the public interest is seldom the motivation for 
instituting FTC investigations; rather they are instituted “at the behest of corporations, 
trade associations and trade unions whose motivation is at best to shift the costs of their 
private litigation to the taxpayer and at worse to harass competitors”.274  
The role that public interest has to play in competition law and policy has tended to divide 
scholars.275 Reksulak (2010) argues that “the ‘public interest theory’ of antitrust policy is on 
a retreating path – and that is squarely in the public’s interest.”276 By drawing on several 
scholarly articles, Reksulak notes that in the application of competition policy, the effects 
that actually emanate diverge from the public interest objectives competition policy 
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purports to hold.277 The author accepts that anticompetitive conduct does exist which 
results in negative total welfare, but nonetheless recommends “caution with respect to 
possible remedies, which can be subject to political interference, susceptible to the sway of 
well-organized interest groups, impacted by activist interpretations of law by the courts and 
misdirected by the whims of bureaucratic agencies.”278 
Voigt (2006) proposes the application of a “robust antitrust policy” in order to avoid 
unintended negative consequences flowing from the application of antitrust, which as 
aforementioned has been argued to be designed to further the public interest.279 The 
author advocates that the driving force underpinning antitrust policy and law application 
should involve a synergy between resource consciousness, economic reasoning, and the 
“general consequences of welfare” being explicitly recognised.280  
b. Public interest in the context of South Africa: 
The creation of South Africa’s present policy regime and competition law was significantly 
influenced by our economic background and political history.281 Shortly after the election of 
the African National Congress (ANC) into government – the first democratic election in the 
country’s history – the Competition Act was drafted.282 South Africa was in the midst of an 
impassioned and sensitive time, during which the ANC was faced with the formidable task of 
reshaping South Africa’s economy in a way which the international community would deem 
acceptable.283 The repressive laws which had prevailed prior to this served to marginalise 
the black majority – including this majority into the formal economy presented an 
incalculable task.284 In order to remedy the deep division along economic and racial lines 
which existed in society, several policy instruments were drafted, seeking to address the 
aforementioned issues and alter the lingering legacy of apartheid - the current competition 
policy (as amended) being among these policy instruments.285 Realising these objectives 
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required synergy between the government’s other industrial policy and competition law and 
policy.286 The performance of traditional competition functions (the maintenance and 
promotion of competition) needed to be provided for in crafting the Act, whilst including 
the needs particular to our developing state.287 It became apparent that South Africa 
needed unique competition policy and law in order to tackle the economic distortions which 
persisted.288 The plan was to curb the white minority’s economic dominance, promote 
greater private sector efficiency, whilst taking cognizance of international practices and 
norms.289 The law which existed at that time was ripe for overhaul and review: the relevant 
legislation from 1979 was revealed by studies to be inadequate, lacking correct political 
context and with deficient powers.290 Ownership concentration and conglomerate or 
vertical combinations were not dealt with, and pre-merger notification was absent as well as 
post-merger control of power which was meaningful.291 Furthermore, it had weak 
prohibitions designed to combat anti-competitive conduct.292  
Uniting the many divergent views and interests, such as those of organised labour through 
trade unions and those of big business, presented a mean feat – a delicate balancing of the 
traditional principles of competition law and equity interests.293 There would need to be 
assurance offered to all the relevant interest groups that the impending legislation would 
sufficiently address their concerns.294 The obvious tension between public interest 
considerations and traditional competition policy or law was identified by big business.295 
They therefore resisted the inclusion of public interest considerations in the Act, arguing 
that other platforms were available which would be more appropriate (like labour courts), 
and that these considerations are essentially arbitrary and of a political nature.296 Organised 
labour, however, was vocal about the concerns of adopting an approach to take-overs and 
mergers which purely concerned itself with efficiency outcomes, as legislation which could 
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curb job losses flowing from a merger which created a highly efficient merged entity was 
attractive.297  
The government, in the form of the Department of Trade and Industry, was adamant that 
these were not irreconcilable interests and that they could be balanced: if policy was 
properly aligned, the developing state’s needs and traditional competition law objectives 
could actually serve to complement one another in practice.298 Private enterprise which still 
served the public interest could successfully be controlled by competition policy.299 The 
Proposed Guidelines illustrate such sentiments:  
“The competition policy proposed here accepts the logic of free and active competition in 
markets, the importance of property rights, the need for greater economic efficiency, the 
objective of ensuring optimal allocation of resources, the principle of transparency, the 
need for greater international competitiveness, and the facilitation of entry into markets—
all within a developmental context that consciously attempts to correct structural 
imbalances and past economic injustices”.300 
The unique challenges which South Africa’s economic development faces were reflected in 
features incorporated into the Act of today, following extensive interaction between the 
government, labour and business as well as other interested parties.301 Considerations 
pertaining to equity issues such as the impact on SMEs, employment and empowerment are 
permitted and in certain instances required.302 Consequently, there is a dual role performed 
by competition law in South Africa, going further than merely achieving market efficiency 
and stimulating competition: it aspires to encourage broad-based economic growth, to see 
that the historical economic structure is addressed, and to be an instrument of economic 
transformation.303  
Understanding the precise meaning of public interest factors and their final expression in 
the Act, requires viewing these factors through the lens of South Africa’s economic and 
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political history.304 The themes of justice and equity run as a common thread throughout 
the Act’s preamble and other sections of the Act.305 The preamble includes motivations for 
the Act, such as policies of efficiency, distribution and equity, and refers to the political 
background.306 It also explicitly states that the Act “seeks to address past practices such as 
apartheid, which led to excessive concentration of ownership and control, inadequate 
restraints on anti-competitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions on full and fair 
participation in the economy”.307 The preamble also states that all of the relevant 
stakeholders’ interests should be balanced in the competitive environment, and that there 
is a focus on all South Africans benefitting from development.308 Due to the South African 
economy’s prior structure, special attention is given to black economic empowerment and 
SME development.309 Smaller enterprises especially faced barriers to entry in the form of 
high levels of concentration present in many industries.310 Concerns pertaining to South 
Africa’s skewed distribution of wealth and income were reflected in the promotion of a 
more broad spread of ownership, particularly in relation to persons who were historically 
disadvantaged.311 Sustainable and balanced development in the long-term could be ensured 
through prioritising a spread of ownership that was more even.312   
As mentioned above, when proposed mergers and acquisitions are evaluated, merger 
control provisions in the Act provide a list of public interest factors which is closed.313 The 
Authorities must apply the orthodox test of substantial lessening of competition, along with: 
 The effect that the merger will have on a particular industrial sector or region;  
 Effect on employment;  
 The ability of small businesses (“SMEs”), or those controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and  
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 The ability of local industries to compete internationally.314 
The prominence of public interest in South Africa outside of the Act has been supported in 
subsequent years through its inclusion in continuous policy development.315 For instance, 
the approach to sector prioritisation adopted by the Competition Commission has served as 
an expression for public interest factors.316 This gave priority to certain critical sectors of the 
economy, being a policy decision which highlighted the likes of food and agro-processing as 
priorities, designed to maximise consumer benefit.317 There are three criteria which form 
the basis of direction of resources towards particular complaints and cases, according to the 
Commission’s prioritization framework: “the potential impact of the conduct on low-income 
consumers; alignment with the government’s broader economic policy objectives; and the 
likelihood of the conduct being anti-competitive.”318 
The Authorities are recognised as being free of political interference, as they are 
independent of the ruling government.319 The Act also expressly requires this.320 However, 
government policy imperatives of a more broad nature are potentially realised by 
Ministerial involvement during the appointment of the Authorities’ collective leadership.321 
The Authorities and government would (at least at the level of policy) be expected to have a 
‘meeting of the minds’.322 What is clear is that, contrary to prohibited conduct, from the 
perspective of mergers, the Act provides for the active involvement of government in the 
proceedings.323 Thus, when prohibited conduct is being assessed, the Authorities have 
sought other avenues through which public interest can be incorporated.324  
In order to understand how this has operated in practice, the abuse of dominance 
jurisprudence in South Africa should be analysed, which reveals the prominence of public 
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interest considerations in such cases, particularly where entities formerly owned by the 
state are involved.325 
Nationwide Poles v Sasol326 
Nationwide Poles CC (Nationwide), a small producer of treated wooden poles, based in the 
Eastern Cape, brought a case against Sasol Oil Limited (Sasol).327 Nationwide sourced its 
wooden poles from sawmills, treating these poles with creosote (a wax additive) or a 
preservative.328 The majority of Nationwide’s customers were vineyards in the Western 
Cape.329 Sasol’s process of synthetic fuel production resulted in tar by-product, which it used 
to produce a range of products, creosote being amongst these.330 A complaint of price 
discrimination and collusion was initially lodged with the Commission by Mr Foot, the owner 
of Nationwide.331 The Commission issued a non-referral notice, having concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence of a contravention.332 The Tribunal was subsequently approached 
by Mr Foot directly, who self-referred the matter.333 The allegation against Sasol was that it 
charged Nationwide a price higher than that which it charged to Nationwide’s most 
important competitor in treated wooden poles’ downstream production.334 The volume of 
historical purchases was allowed by Sasol’s price schedule as a basis for discounted prices – 
this was not in dispute.335 The respondent argued that the 3% - 4% cost deferential that 
existed was insubstantial – the most preferred prices were received by the largest creosote 
customers.336 It was alleged by Nationwide that Sasol was guilty of a contravention of 
Section 9 of the Competition Act, with its pricing policy amounting to prohibited price 
discrimination.337 The Tribunal identified and acknowledged Sasol’s market dominance for 
the provision of creosote, in its evaluation of the conduct being alleged.338 Furthermore, it 
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was held by the Tribunal that Sasol “behaved to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers or suppliers” when it set the price of its creosote.339 
In assessing the merits of this allegation, the Tribunal noted that whilst section 8 of the Act 
generally regards itself with abuse of dominance, the Act intentionally included a separate 
section for price discrimination.340 The Tribunal posited that “the legislature’s concern with 
maintaining accessible, competitively structured markets, which markets would 
accommodate new entrants and enable them to compete effectively against larger and 
well-established incumbents” was reflected by the separate space in the Act given to price 
discrimination and its prohibition.341 Entering new markets may be more challenging for 
SMEs, who would struggle to thrive and compete effectively on the merits, when price 
discrimination was present and the playing field was not level.342 The Tribunal argued that 
the equitable treatment of SMEs was a stated purpose of the Act, which was a reflection of 
the legislators’ concern with small business being developed.343 Supporting SMEs through 
the principles and instruments of the Act was a legislative intention which was set out in the 
Act’s explanatory memorandum – the Tribunal referred to this fact.344 
It was argued by the Tribunal, referring to the Act’s purposes and preamble, that when 
assessing price discrimination “although incorporating considerations of equity into 
competition analysis, which may be anathema to a competition law approach that insists on 
a pure consumer welfare standard that it is generally referenced by a reduction in output or 
an increase in price, the utilization of a fairness standard is not alien to the Act and practice. 
The Tribunal further argued that the mere fact that equity considerations sit uncomfortably 
in competition economics orthodoxy is no warrant for ignoring the intention by the 
legislature that such equity considerations play a role in the decisions of the Authorities. The 
Tribunal thus found Sasol guilty of contravening Section 9 of the Competition Act.”345 
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Sasol responded to the Tribunal’s decision by lodging an appeal against it, focusing on the 
Tribunal’s interpretation of section 9(1) of the Act in their argument.346 Sasol submitted that 
a substantial prevention or lessening of competition caused by the volume based discount 
pricing of the appellant had not been proven as likely, meaning the Tribunal had erred in its 
finding – no such likelihood had been established.347 The Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”) 
ultimately ruled that there had been insufficient evidence presented by Nationwide to 
support the view that, within the relevant market, the conduct of Sasol was “likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition”.348 Nationwide, despite successfully 
establishing that its business had been harmed, an impact on the market as a whole flowing 
from the behaviour of Sasol had not been established.349  
The integral role that SMEs protection plays in the Act seems to be acknowledged by the 
CAC in relation to the Tribunal’s adopted public interest approach.350 The remarks of Kyu-
UcK Lee, the Korean Competition Advisory Board chair, were quoted by the CAC in support 
of this position: 
“In a developing economy where, incipiently, economic power is not fairly distributed, 
competition policy must play the dual role of raising the power, within reasonable bounds, 
of underprivileged economic agents to become viable participants in the process of 
competition on the one hand, and of establishing the rules of fair and free competition on 
the other. If these two objectives are not met, unfettered competition will simply help a 
handful of privileged big firms to monopolize domestic markets that are used and protected 
through import restrictions. This will give rise to public dissatisfaction since the game itself 
has is not been played in a socially acceptable, fair manner.”351 
Despite this, the CAC did not support an extension of the objective of protecting SMEs (as 
enshrined in the Act’s objectives and preamble) by the Tribunal into the construction of 
Section 9.352   
                                                          
346 Supra note 239 at 8. 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
41 
 
Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and 
Another353 
The role of state support in South Africa’s steel market competitive landscape was 
considered by the Tribunal in a case involving ArcelorMittal and excessive pricing – the 
Tribunal linked this (along with the pricing conduct of ArcelorMittal) to the impact on 
downstream manufacturing markets.354 Accordingly, it was indicated by the Tribunal that 
the pricing behaviour of state support recipient firms would be subject to some state 
intervention, with the state being “entitled to take an active interest”, and that for these 
firms “the risks for competition are substantially different”.355 Furthermore, the Tribunal 
noted that consumers of the intermediate products produced by such firms, where relevant, 
would benefit from firms being obliged to price these products supportively.356 This reflects 
that the Tribunal considered that national developmental imperatives were formative in the 
pricing behaviour of firms receiving support from the state, and that the Tribunal recognised 
this to be in the public interest.357  
Competition Commission v Sasol Chemical Industries Limited358 
The case against Sasol Chemical Industries (“Sasol”), involving excessive pricing, recently 
reaffirmed the Tribunal’s approach in this regard.359 The Tribunal emphasised and 
considered how Sasol was historically afforded state support with regards to how the 
reasonableness of the difference between the economic value of and the price charged for 
polypropylene and purified propylene was measured, despite Sasol having been privatised 
for many years.360 Sasol was a recipient of regulatory interventions and legislative state 
support, seeking to ensure Sasol’s profitability and sustainability.361 The Tribunal assessed 
the source of Sasol’s market dominance, identifying that it was not risk taking and 
innovation which had caused them to attain and sustain their cost advantage – rather this 
was the result of state support, which had the consequence of making Sasol’s costs in the 
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production of feedstock propylene some of the lowest in the world, ultimately making Sasol 
a low-cost polypropylene and purified propylene producer.362 Sasol attempted to justify this 
position by countering that they had repaid all state support they had received in monetary 
terms, however the Tribunal noted that the nature of the state support they had received 
was of a prolonged and considerable nature and as such it amounted to more than the 
monetary terms expressed, and its impact had created Sasol’s enduring dominance in the 
markets which this case considered.363  
It becomes apparent from the above canvassed cases that although the Act’s prohibited 
conduct provisions do not specifically set out the incorporation of public interest, the 
Authorities are in practice including such considerations when assessing prohibited conduct, 
albeit in an indirect manner, particularly when a case involves formerly state owned entities 
facing abuse of dominance allegations.364 These cases illustrate the acute awareness that 
the Tribunal has with regards to the significant interplay between South Africa’s policy 
objectives relating to industrial development and competition policy and law.365 The former 
being vital for economic development through provision of access to services or products 
not ordinarily provided by the market, the encouragement of activity in a particular region, 
protecting and promoting SMEs, and countering any decline in designated industries.366 
These cases provide valuable lessons which will become increasingly apparent later in this 
paper.367 
c. A comparative look at other jurisdictions and their approach to the public interest: 
It has been noted by Smith and Swan (2014) during their assessment of various jurisdictions 
and their approach to provisions of a public interest nature, that many jurisdictions provide 
for and consider such factors, especially in Africa, however there is a substantial variation in 
the scope given to the public interest, with a great variety of differing formulations for 
this.368   
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The United Kingdom’s competition authorities historically (from 1948 to 1998) employed a 
public interest test which incorporated various factors, like protecting exports and 
employment – this allowed for “fairly unconstrained political discretion”, according to Scott 
(2009).369 The UK Competition Authorities were given discretion by the Fair Trade Act of 
that time, which Hay (1997) states gave them freedom on what they would consider when 
determining what was in the public interest, and in essence extended the scope of public 
interest considerations, making their function more than the mere promotion of 
competition.370 As stated by Scott (2009), national security protection was the sole 
stipulated public interest consideration in the UK, as of 2002.371 
The deleterious impact on the public interest that any prohibited conduct which hinders 
free competition plays is recognised by the Spanish Competition Act.372 In this regard, 
economic principles of a traditional nature in competition law and the competitive 
outcomes expected are recognised by the Spanish competition authorities as representative 
of the public interest.373 Market or economic integration is prioritised in the European 
Union, according to the UNCTAD (2002) survey of various jurisdictions and their competition 
policy objectives.374  
In the Unites States, it has been noted by Smith and Swan (2014), that their competition 
regime in some instances protects smalls businesses by conferring competition law 
immunity on them.375 The authors cite Posner (2001) in noting that the Clayton Act and the 
Sherman Act appear to make no provision for the public interest, whilst the Small Business 
Act “confers antitrust immunity on joint actions undertaken by small business firms in 
response to a request by the President pursuant to a voluntary agreement or program 
approved by the President to further the objectives of the Small Business Act, if found by 
the President to be in the public interest as contributing to the national defense.”376 It is not 
general practice in the US competition regime to review exploitative pricing, but 
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interestingly there are certain circumstances which make this permissible, Dolman (2005) 
notes: where the interest that the public has in consumer prices being lowered is clear and 
there is an absence of alternative remedies or an expectation of a new entry.377  
Oxenham (2012) identifies several African jurisdictions where competition regulation 
includes public interest consideration in some form, namely: Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, 
Botswana, and Swaziland.378 Despite this, these jurisdictions do not tend to extend such 
provisions to exemptions or prohibited conduct; rather they are primarily preoccupied with 
merger activity assessment.379 South Africa shares a similar focus.380 Despite not making 
mention of specific factors, Botswana notably cites public interest as a potential basis for 
interim relief in relation to investigations of anti-competitive agreements or potential 
abuses of dominance.381  
In Zambia, there is an essentially unlimited scope of potential factors that can be 
considered, as noted by Smith and Swan (2014), which includes: international 
competitiveness, exports and employment along with “socioeconomic factors as may be 
appropriate; and any other factor that bears upon the public interest.”382 Although there are 
no specific factors mentioned, public interest is cited by the authors as a potential basis for 
interim measures in investigations into abuse of dominance, prohibited agreements and 
merger control.383 According to Smith and Swan (2014), the Kenyan approach is that an 
exemption or other anti-competitive agreement can be justified by public interest factors 
which would include exports maintenance and promotion, stability being promoted, or 
“obtaining a benefit for the public”.384 Once again, Smith and Swan (2014) note that despite 
no specific factors being mentioned, public interest factors can provide a potential basis for 
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interim relief relating to restrictive agreement investigations and trade practices of a 
restrictive nature which involve trade associations.385  
In Malawi, when potential abuses of dominance or agreements of an anti-competitive 
nature are evaluated (other than unilateral conduct and hard-core price fixing), public 
interest factors are considered.386 Smith and Swan (2014) further note that in Gambia, the 
role of public interest factors is limited, functioning as a list of potentially offsetting factors 
when an abuse, an anti-competitive agreement, or merger has come to light.387 The 
standard competition assessment would only exclude consideration pertaining to 
“enhancing the effectiveness of the Government’s programme for the development of the 
economy of the Gambia”.388 
Public interest considerations are so pervasive that even the Chinese competition 
authorities appear to include these when prohibited conduct is assessed to the extent that it 
impacts priority sectors and/or case selection.389 Accordingly, it has been noted by Wang et 
al (2012) that several of the National Development and Reform Commission’s investigations 
into prohibited conduct, including the investigation of cartels, would appear to focus on 
substantial public interest products, namely foods, salt, telecoms, and popular medicine 
inputs.390  
Public interest factors have also been considered when assessing restrictive trade practices 
in India, through the Indian Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission 
(MRTPC).391 Case law provides evidence in support of this: 
Alkali Manufacturers Association of India vs American Natural Soda Ash Corporation, 1998 
(see also the case of All India Float Glass Manufacturers Association vs PT Mulia Industries, 
Jakarta and others, 2000 CTJ 252 (MRTP)).392 This case involved several American soda ash 
producers who were involved in combined importing of soda ash into the Indian market.393 
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The Indian Act restricts cartel activity, and the complainants levied allegations against the 
respondents that they were involved in precisely such activity.394 Specifically, it was alleged 
that there was a predatory nature to the respondent’s pricing, although this allegation was 
not ultimately pursued.395 The MRTPC found in favour of the complainant, arguing that a 
part of the public interest would be Indian soda ash firms possibly closing, and the worker 
unemployment that would result, all occasioned by the alleged conduct.396 The MRTPC was 
alive to the salient public and consumer interest questions which this case raised, and 
consequently allowed individual importation by American soda ash producers, but operating 
as a cartel was prohibited.397  
11. A promising step forward – the Competition Commission’s 
Guidelines for the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in 
Mergers: 
There is general consensus that South African merger policy should include public interest 
considerations.398 Our democratically-elected government formed our competition 
legislation which endorses such inclusion: the underlying motivation being to address the 
legacy of apartheid by achieving imperatives relating to economic development, and finding 
remedies to socio-economic issues – statutes like our Competition Act form part of various 
policy instruments available to the state to ensure this.399 Competition policy needs to be 
sensitive to the socio-economic needs of our society broadly.400 However, the precise 
practical application of these public interest considerations to merger proceedings is 
contentious.401 In order to fully harness the might of competition law in redressing 
developmental needs broadly, the government appears to prefer a prominent role for these 
considerations.402  
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This robust approach is more concerning to competition agencies and practitioners, who 
caution that competition policy cannot be the exclusive means used to address these 
developmental needs.403 It is critical to identify what the expectations of competition policy 
are, and that the boundaries of this policy be delineated clearly, to ensure that the scope of 
its intended use is not exceeded.404  
It is also challenging to ascertain how public interest is measured, and precisely what 
constitutes public interest.405 The intended meaning of public interest is made clear by 
specifications in our Act, but guidelines for how it is measured are absent, which means that 
this must be determined in each individual case by the competition authorities.406 In 
applying public interest considerations in practice, the limits of these have been interpreted 
in varying ways, as the cases discussed have made apparent.407 In Wal-Mart/Massmart, the 
Tribunal acknowledged that it was only empowered to safeguard rights which pre-existed 
the merger and were threatened by this – the creation of rights which did not exist prior to 
the merger was not within its power.408 In order to avoid the conflation of competition 
policy’s purposes with objectives where it would be more appropriate for different 
economic policies to pursue these, distinct boundaries for the practical application of the 
redistributive justice allowances that the Act makes are necessary.409  
There has been controversy surrounding whether competition authorities are suited to deal 
with the public interest.410 Popular opinion in South Africa has arguably been shifting in 
recent years towards support of the idea that there are more suitably-equipped agencies 
that ought to deal with these considerations.411 There was a decisive answer to this 
question submitted in Metropolitan/Momentum, which contended that in a merger, 
employment considerations are crucial, despite these considerations being secondary to 
other legislation (which was identified in Shell/Tepco): there are duties relating to 
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employment that competition authorities are tasked with, that are distinct (for example) 
from those of the Employment Equity Act.412 
Determining whether there is fair process towards affected employees, and what a firm’s 
operational requirements are, is the responsibility of Labour Tribunals – there is a different 
mandate faced by the competition authorities.413 It is the task of the Competition Tribunal 
to determine whether the merger (which is responsible for creating these operational 
requirements) should in the first place have been permitted.414 This is a distinct focus from 
that of the labour agencies, which are primarily concerned with establishing whether 
affected employees face fair process.415  
Merger-specificity becomes the underlying principle common to all of these considerations: 
the public interest should only be considered and grappled with by competition authorities 
insofar as this has a cognizable link to the specific merger in question.416 A plethora of 
unintended consequences would arise if one attempted to divorce public interest from the 
competition analysis, or if such considerations were to be overzealously applied.417 The only 
rational and objective approach that appears to be available is to consider all factors in a 
merger-specific sense.418 
A promising step forward occurred earlier this year when the Commission published public 
interest guidelines for how to approach this issue when investigating mergers, as well as 
indicating what information the Commission would prefer be provided by parties in their 
merger notifications.419 A five-step broad analysis was outlined by the Commission that it 
will conduct in relation to all proposed transactions which involve the public interest: 
“Firstly, the Commission will determine the likely effect of the transaction on the public 
interest, followed by a determination as to whether or not that alleged effect is merger 
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specific. Then, the authorities will assess whether this effect is substantial and, if so, 
whether the merging parties can justify the likely effect on the public interest. Lastly, any 
possible remedies to address the negative public interest effect will be evaluated.”420 
If there is an insufficient causal nexus between the harm to public interest anticipated and 
the transaction being considered – i.e. the effect of the transaction is found to not be 
merger-specific – the Commission’s inquiry will go no further.421 A finding that an effect is 
merger-specific but insubstantial will also result in the public interest assessment being 
stopped at this point.422  
It ultimately comes down to the Commission balancing its public interest inquiry results 
against is competition impact assessment.423 Saliently, approval of a transaction is possible if 
its benefit to the public interest is greater than its anti-competitive impact and vice versa.424  
This approach is generally applicable when assessing each public interest ground, however 
the Competition Commission also provided more specific detail of the different 
considerations that are relevant for each particular public interest ground – there are 
specialised approaches for each of these.425 
a. The effect on a particular industrial sector or region: 
The Commission may consider, when attempting to determine what effect on an industrial 
sector or region is likely, whether the firm being acquired is South African-owned; whether 
there would be far-reaching consequences which result from terminating local production; 
and whether goods produced locally would be substituted with imports as a result of the 
merger.426 When assessing the issue of substantiality, the crucial considerations are how 
strategically important to the sector the product in question is, or the importance of the 
sector to the economy as a whole; the magnitude of the consequences flowing from the 
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merger for the specific sector and the economy more broadly – there is a greater likelihood 
that an effect will be substantial if the ramifications extend further than the primary market 
or sector); and whether there are any public policy goals which are impeded by the 
merger.427 
When an effect on any industrial sector or region is found to be substantial, the Commission 
is open to considering justifications based on any public interest argument.428 With regards 
to remedies, the Commission offers several possible examples which could be appropriate, 
however it emphasises that imposing these must occur on a case-by-case basis.429 Some 
examples which could be appropriate are: 
“requiring investment into the local supply chain; maintaining or expanding local production 
facilities; and requiring the continued supply to local producers or sourcing from local 
suppliers.”430 
b. The effect on employment: 
When attempting to determine what effect on employment is likely, the Commission will 
primarily focus on employment within the parties that are merging – i.e. not on the effect 
on employment in the economy as a whole.431 All retrenchments being contemplated by the 
merging parties will have to be declared to the Commission – it does not matter whether 
these parties consider the retrenchments to be merger-specific or not.432 The effect on the 
general level of employment in the industrial sector or region which is likely, and if the 
merger will have an impact on the creation of jobs and duplications more broadly, will then 
be the secondary focus of the Commission.433  
The proximity of the retrenchments to the merger is salient for determining whether 
retrenchments are merger-specific.434 All retrenchments which occur from when merger 
discussions are initiated, to the date the merger is filed, and within a one-year period after 
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the merger is approved, will be assumed to be merger specific – the onus will be on the 
parties to prove that retrenchments which occur within this time period are not merger-
specific.435 The Commission also offers relevant considerations when determining merger-
specificity: “whether the proposed retrenchments are linked to the intentions, incentives or 
management style of the acquiring group and whether, but for the merger, the 
retrenchments would have in any event occurred.”436 
When attempting to determine whether the effect on employment is substantial, the 
Commission states that it will consider: “the number of affected employees; the affected 
employees’ skill levels; their likelihood of finding alternative employment; the nature of the 
sector (for example, its unemployment rate and trends of retrenchment); and the nature of 
the acquiring firm’s business (for example, whether it employs seasonal or permanent 
staff)”.437 In general, the effect will be more substantial if retrenchments involve more 
unskilled and semi-skilled employees without short-term prospects of re-employment.438  
With regards to justification, all three of the following requirements would need to be met 
by parties: 
 “i) demonstrate the rationality of the process followed at arriving at the number of 
retrenchments and the rationality of the link between the number of jobs lost and the 
reasons therefor; ii) justify the job losses with an equally weighty and countervailing public 
interest argument under the Act (such as the need to save a failing firm; the need to ensure 
the efficiency and competitiveness of the firm by lowering its costs; or the necessity of the 
retrenchments to bring about lower costs and thus lower knock-on prices for consumers); 
and iii) demonstrate that they have provided full and complete information to the 
Commission and employees, to enable them to consult fully on all issues.”439 
The Commission provides examples of remedies which could be appropriate in the context 
of employment concerns, which include: imposing a restriction on the number of jobs that 
can be lost; staggering these job losses over a certain time period; instituting a moratorium 
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on job losses for a time period; making the parties fund reskilling for employees that are 
affected.440  
c. The ability of small businesses (SMEs), or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons (HDIs), to become competitive: 
The Commission will look at the merger being proposed and determine whether it results in 
the following effects on SMEs and HDIs: “raising or creating barriers to entry; preventing 
access to key inputs; denying access to suppliers; and denying access to funding for business 
development and growth.”441 
When determining whether the impact of the merger on SMEs and HDIs, in terms of their 
ability to become competitive, is substantial, the Commission states that it will consider: 
“whether the affected SMEs or HDIs are impeded from competing in the market; whether 
they constrain larger players, such that their impediment restricts dynamic competition and 
growth; whether the restriction in growth and competition limits growth and expansion of 
SMEs and HDIs and their participation in adjacent sectors; and whether the effect has an 
impact on other public interest grounds.”442 
The Commission also provides possible remedies which could be used to address any 
negative impact on SME’s and HDI’s ability to become competitive: 
 “establishing a supplier development fund for technical and financial support; requiring the 
merging parties to provide favourable discounts and prices; and obligating parties to 
continue access and supply.”443 
d. The ability of national industries to compete in international markets: 
According to the Commission’s Draft Guidelines, this ground will only be applicable when an 
anti-competitive merger or a merger which results in other negative public interest concerns 
is sought to be sanctioned by a party.444 The party who relies on this ground will bear the 
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onus of advancing arguments to support it.445 The Commission will be open to considering 
arguments relating to: 
“the efficiency benefits for the economy; whether such benefits arise from the merger or 
could not be achieved in its absence; and whether such benefits outweigh any anti-
competitive effects or negative public interest concerns brought about by the merger.”446 
12. Conclusion: 
Whilst these guidelines represent a useful, concrete and coherent aid for ascertaining how 
the Commission will address the public interest in merger investigations, bringing some 
harmony to the often unclear and inconsistent approaches that have been taken in the past, 
these guidelines will not be binding: competition authorities will still enjoy unfettered 
discretion to consider public interest issues as they deem appropriate.447 They only serve to 
reflect the view of the Commission.448 These guidelines still need to be tested before the 
Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court to see if they find support in these 
bodies, and to determine how they will operate in practice.449 However, parties should be 
cognisant of these guidelines as they will more than likely determine how the Commission 
will approach these issues when investigating merger notifications submitted to it.450  
It becomes evident that the political and socio-economic imperatives of a particular country 
determine what formulation of public interest is adopted.451 There is also a common 
tendency for friction to occur between the underlying competition law and policy, economic 
and efficiency-centred principles and public interest factor consideration.452 In practice it is 
typical for jurisdictions (and South Africa is no exception) to explicitly incorporate public 
interest factors solely in provisions pertaining to merger control.453  
In South Africa, however, in certain circumstances, when prohibited conduct or exemptions 
are evaluated (especially when state owned entities are facing abuse of dominance 
                                                          
445 Supra note 425. 
446 Ibid. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Supra note 419. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Supra note 239 at 11. 
453 Ibid. 
54 
 
allegations), public interest considerations can occasionally be taken into account.454 There 
is precedent illustrative of this, which has been discussed above.455 Authorities may have 
unintentionally strayed into assuming a price regulation role, with the Sasol and Mittal 
judgments being indicative of this.456 It becomes necessary to question whether Authorities 
should directly engage in the regulation of prices, when tasked with adjudicating anti-
competitive behaviour allegations.457 The approach that the Tribunal has taken in the above 
canvassed cases is revealing.458 Formerly state owned entities (such as Telkom, Sasol, and 
Mittal) appear to be expected to set their prices in a manner which is cognizant of the 
economic developmental imperatives of our country, but there is scant further guidance as 
to the interpretation of this.459 By the Authorities, even indirectly, encroaching into the 
regulation of prices with regards to these entities, the role that these play subsequent to 
their privatisation is up in the air.460 It could be argued that despite having been privatised, 
these entities are still considered to be public utilities, meaning that they would typically be 
subject to regulation.461  
There may be space for prohibited conduct assessment to include public interest factors.462 
Our South African Act was constructed in such a way so as to ensure that strict adherence to 
the legislation of developed jurisdictions is not followed – and this is appropriate 
considering our specific needs.463 The peculiarities of the developmental context we were 
confronted with needed to be accounted for by our Act, which also needed to be fit for the 
purpose of rising to the challenges that this context presented.464 There is a delicate 
balancing act which must occur during the enforcement of our Act, and this presents its 
challenges.465 When concerns pertaining to pure economic efficiency are balanced against 
the competing objectives of the public interest, problems relating to firms’ compliance and 
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Authorities monitoring this may present themselves.466 There is a risk in conducting this 
sensitive balancing act which necessarily occurs in the process of adjudication, that the 
Authorities may exceed their mandate when seeking to address issues that other fora would 
be better able to remedy.467 It is suggested that due to the broad and varied nature of these 
public interest considerations, a cautious approach involving sufficient safeguards to 
counter any abuse of such provisions be adopted: the competitive assessment is primary, 
and the public interest should be an exceptional consideration.468 “It may be difficult to 
coordinate between the government’s objective of promoting public interest and 
competition authority’s objective of promoting efficient markets”, according to the UNCTAD 
(2008), and thus we should strive to weigh public interest concerns against those of 
economic efficiency in the best manner possible.469   
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